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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

TEACHING HEALTH LAW FROM A SOCIAL-ECOLOGICAL
PERSPECTIVE

LINDSAY F. WILEY*
I started teaching health law relatively recently—in the fall of 2010, just
after the Affordable Care Act (“ACA”) was enacted, but before much of it had
been implemented. This timing has been a blessing because I started with a
fresh slate rather than adding the ACA on top of a previously developed
course. It has also been a curse, but ultimately I appreciate that I started
teaching the course at a time when the ACA was under constant threat. The
ever-evolving nature of health law means that health law teachers must always
bear in mind a goal that applies to all teaching: we must prepare students for
the challenges they will face over the coming half-century without knowing
exactly what those challenges will look like. Knowledge of current health law
statutes, regulations, and case law serves primarily as the medium in which we
practice skills together in the classroom.
I. SOME PRELIMINARIES
With the twin goals of building knowledge and honing skills, I designed
my survey course around a series of in-class exercises that occupy about threequarters of our time in class. Students work in groups of two to four to
generate client advice, judicial memos, and guidance for state and federal
lawmakers. In most cases, we work through these exercises after doing
background reading and reviewing a basic outline of the key issues together as
a class. While students work through the exercises, I circulate among the
groups and dialogue with them about their process and ideas. Rather than
having groups report back to the class in any formal way, I wrap up each
exercise by calling on particular students to share specific insights with the
group or to engage in a role-playing exercise. I encourage, but do not require,
students to draft written responses to the in-class exercise prompts as part of
their preparation for the final exam, which is modeled on the exercises.
My course is designed to meet the needs of dabblers who are curious about
health law but don’t expect to practice in the area. It also functions as an
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introduction for beginning experts—those who know they are interested in
practicing health law and will take several additional specialized courses. I am
fortunate to work with a stellar group of health law practitioners from the
Washington D.C. community who teach more than a dozen specialized health
law courses as part-time faculty at American University. We have a large
student body, and about fifteen percent of students express an interest in
practicing health law. My course has been taught for four credits, though I am
experimenting with a more intensive three-credit version in the spring 2017
semester. I typically have between twenty and forty students in the class.
My course is designed primarily for law students who have completed
courses in torts, contracts, and constitutional law. Most of the students in my
course are in the first semester of their second year of law school
(constitutional law is a required first-year course), joined by a handful of thirdyear students and typically two or three lawyers (many of whom trained at
foreign law schools) who are taking the course as LL.M. students. Few of my
students have completed a course in administrative law, though many of them
are taking administrative law concurrently with the health law survey course.
II. THE SOCIAL-ECOLOGICAL MODEL AS A BLUEPRINT FOR THE HEALTH LAW
SURVEY COURSE
With all of that in mind, the first year I taught the course I set out to
identify some organizing themes. I’m a visual thinker, so I started with what
my students now refer to as the “bullseye.” I draw it on the white board the
first day and come back to it each time we transition from one major topic to
the next. It is loosely based on the social-ecological model of health that drives
my scholarly work in public health law, but with an emphasis on the health
care sector.
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Figure 1: The Social-Ecological Model of Health

Figure 2: A Social-Ecological Model of Health Care
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Many colleagues (most influentially for me, Elizabeth Weeks Leonard,
Nicole Huberfeld, and Kevin Outterson when they introduced their newly
published health law case book 1 while it was still a work in progress) rightly
point out that after the ACA, health law is no longer driven by private law.
Nonetheless, I find private law is a great entry point for my students, most of
whom are fresh off a first year curriculum that is heavy on torts and contracts.
Medical malpractice law occupies an ever-smaller proportion of my course, but
I find it to be a helpful starting point because it allows us to focus on the
interaction between an individual health care provider and patient—something
all my students have experienced first-hand.
My approach to the health law survey class is heavily influenced by the
population-level focus of my work as a public health law scholar. So why do I
put the individual patient at the center of the bullseye? Why do I start with
individualistic, relational health care encounters? Because those encounters are
what virtually everyone thinks of when they think about health. It works well
to meet students where they are and then gradually widen the lens to
encompass other factors and a broader conception of health. And, after all, at
the root of public health’s focus on collective needs and social justice is respect
for the dignity of individual people.
III. HEALTH CARE AND INDIVIDUAL AUTONOMY
I start the course with informed consent and the ways in which civil
liability is used as a tool to shape (and, initially at least, bring into being)
discussion between doctor and patient about medical treatment. This is an
intensely relational discussion, focused on the particular values a specific
patient brings to the table and the particular assumptions, biases, and fears that
influence a specific doctor. Immediately, however, I raise questions about
other stakeholders outside the doctor-patient dyad. What about the hospital’s
obligations? What considerations might it want the doctor and patient to take
into account? What about the third-party payer and others who are within the
same risk pool who will share the cost of premium increases as health care
expenditures rise? Should the doctor share information about the relative cost
of various treatment options? Do we expect the doctor to even know about the
relative cost?
Our discussion of the role cost considerations should play in doctor-patient
decision-making leads us to consider the interests of the public as a whole with
regard to other aspects of treatment. Should doctors discuss issues like
antibiotic resistance or the need for a patient’s sexual partner or other contacts
to seek medical attention? How far do these obligations extend? When students

1. NICOLE HUBERFELD, ELIZABETH WEEKS & KEVIN OUTTERSON, THE LAW OF
AMERICAN HEALTH CARE (2017).
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push back against the idea that health care providers should consider anything
but the needs of the patient, I sometimes ask them whether doctors should
advise parents in a community with high vaccination rates to free-ride on herd
immunity provided by others rather than have their children vaccinated,
undertaking a minimal—but real—risk. My goal, influenced by Wendy
Parmet’s excellent chapter on health care law in her book on viewing law (writ
large) through a population health lens, 2 is to encourage students to see the full
range of interests at stake in decisions about medical treatment. This gradual
widening of our lens provides a perfect introduction to the bullseye and allows
me to introduce the public—and not merely the aggregation of individual
patient interests—as a health law stakeholder, something I am also exploring in
my scholarly work. 3
IV. HEALTH CARE QUALITY
After a couple of additional class sessions on issues that primarily concern
patient autonomy (including end of life decision-making and health
information privacy—we don’t spend much time on these topics, so I urge
students to take the excellent bioethics and privacy courses offered by my
adjunct faculty colleagues), we move on to health care quality. Helling v.
Carey, in which a judge ignored the customary reasonable doctor standard of
care and instead used a form of cost-benefit analysis to find that failure to
administer a simple and seemingly cost-free puff test to detect glaucoma could
amount to malpractice even though all expert witnesses involved agreed that it
was not common practice among ophthalmologists to perform the test on lowrisk patients, is an excellent cautionary tale to start with. 4 I use Vaughn v.
Menlove (in which the defendant farmer argued that he did his personal best
and should not be punished for lacking “the highest order of intelligence”) in a
similar fashion in my torts class. 5 The glaucoma test also provides nice
opportunity to raise the cascade of interventions (in a context that’s slightly
less personal for me than labor and delivery) before addressing all the messy
details of high-intervention childbirth using the Furrow casebook’s To Monitor
or Not problem. 6 To Monitor or Not is one of my favorite client advising
problems, prompting students to think about how to engage their client in a

2. WENDY E. PARMET, POPULATIONS, PUBLIC HEALTH, AND THE LAW 191–218 (2009).
3. Lindsay F. Wiley, Health Law as Social Justice, 24 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 47
(2014); Lindsay F. Wiley, From Patient Rights to Health Justice: Securing the Public’s Interest
in Affordable, High-Quality Health Care, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 833 (2016).
4. Helling v. Carey, 519 P.2d 981, 983 (Wash. 1974).
5. Vaughn v. Menlove (1837) 132 Eng. Rep. 490, 492; 3 Bing. (N.C.) 468, 471 (C.P.).
6. BARRY R. FURROW, THOMAS L. GREANEY, SANDRA H. JOHNSON, TIMOTHY S. JOST &
ROBERT L. SCHWARTZ, HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS (7th ed. 2013).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

386

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 61:381

dialogue about competing concerns and how to navigate the nuances of the
standard of care for malpractice.
After a few classes on physician malpractice and hospital liability with
liberal use of client counseling problems (Creating a Shield, in the Furrow
book, 7 is another favorite), we transition to market-based regulatory
approaches to improving health care quality. I assign lengthy excerpts from the
Pennsylvania MCARE Act 8 and Joint Commission guidelines 9 for students to
work through in the context of client advising scenarios. After introducing a
series of cases and sample state scope of practice laws, we spend significant
time on a client advising problem in which a group of doctors, influenced by
Medicare payment incentives (spoilers!), wishes to rely more heavily on nurses
and lay patient care coordinators. When we reflect on those exercises, I like to
linger on a discussion of the goals of reporting regimes, disciplinary actions,
and scope of practice laws and how well suited (relative to malpractice liability
and other alternatives) they are for their purported purposes. This also sets up a
nice discussion of the relative strengths of primary care physicians, specialists,
nurses, and other health care professionals and lay support staff from the
perspective of patient advocates, payers, and the public.
V. HEALTH CARE COSTS AND ACCESS
We begin the unit on costs and access, which makes up about one-half of
the course, by focusing on the obligations of health care providers to care for
patients, starting with the formation and termination of the treatment
relationship and common law obligations of continuing care. We then
transition to EMTALA, 10 focusing on the distinctions between the statute’s
obligations and the common law framework that predated it. This structure
allows us to explore broader ideas about the pros and cons of common law
versus regulatory approaches while also considering the distinction between
ethical obligations and legal obligations.
My favorite thing about teaching EMTALA is that it naturally prompts a
discussion about the mutual aid approach to health care financing. What does it
mean to require hospitals to provide uncompensated care? If the costs are
passed along to all patients and payers, then we are talking about a form of
mutual aid, but a hidden form. An excellent article by Nicole Huberfeld and
Jessica Roberts 11 has given me fresh fodder for this discussion, which

7. Id. at 431–32.
8. 40 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 1303.101–1303.1115 (2002).
9. THE JOINT COMMISSION, https://www.jointcommission.org [https://perma.cc/8U57U6PZ].
10. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2012).
11. Nicole Huberfeld & Jessica L. Roberts, Health Care and the Myth of Self Reliance, 57
B.C. L. REV. 1 (2016).
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previews all of the different ways that we collectively bear health care costs
and the wide ranging implications of which health care costs should spur
mutual aid. And this discussion naturally leads to consideration of why
policymakers prioritize (often expensive) rescue care over (often less
expensive) preventive care.
At this point, I cannot resist sharing the upstream/downstream parable—in
many ways the foundational myth of public health—with my students. For
those who don’t have it seared into their brains like I do, the idea is that there
is a village next to a river. One day, the villagers notice bodies floating by. The
immediately rush into the water, risking their own lives to fish out the victims
and resuscitate them. The steady flow of victims never lets up and the villagers
are so occupied by the valiant effort to rescue them that it doesn’t occur to
anyone to travel upstream and figure out what’s pushing people in.
Finally, after much anticipation, we expand our focus to discuss third party
payers. I assign Deborah Stone’s seminal article 12 on mutual aid and actuarial
fairness (one of very few secondary sources I assign), which reinforces the
ideas we have generated on our own in the previous class on EMTALA. We
begin with coverage disputes between individuals and private insurance
companies. I warn students that coverage disputes will be a unifying theme
from here on out and that they should pay close attention to how different an
individual’s options for recourse are depending on whether they have private
insurance covered by ERISA, private insurance that falls outside ERISA,
Medicare, or Medicaid. My left-leaning students are sometimes surprised to
hear me express sympathy for health insurance companies who refuse to cover
services that patients and their doctors say they need. It takes some effort, but
not much, to encourage them to see how coverage of expensive services that
turn out to be unnecessary (e.g., high-dose chemotherapy with autologous bone
marrow transplant for breast cancer) is an outcome to be avoided. And not only
because the costs are spread to others.
They already understand the basics of how a contract dispute against an
insurer works, so we focus primarily on tort claims against managed care
organizations. These cases provide a perfect opportunity to discuss the
blending of financing with treatment decisions and other aspects of health care
delivery. We focus on the three tools that characterize managed care—limited
provider networks, primary care providers as gatekeepers, and utilization
review—rather than being overly concerned with the plethora of labels that
health plans use to market themselves. After looking at managed care from the
perspective of tort liability, we shift to state and then federal regulation of the
practices that define it. Like a mom ruining a perfectly good batch of mac and
cheese with broccoli florets, I stuff a bit of ERISA preemption in among the
12. Deborah A. Stone, The Struggle for the Soul of Health Insurance, 18 J. HEALTH POL.
POL’Y & L. 287 (1993).
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state patient protection statutes, HIPAA portability provisions, and ACA
underwriting reforms. In addition to several scenarios in which students are
advocates for insureds against MCOs and vice versa, we do a lengthy problem
focused on advising an employer working with an insurer to develop a
wellness incentive program. Although this may seem like a relatively minor
area of health law, I find that it does a good job of drawing out the nuances of
“rational” health status-related discrimination, especially in a class where few
if any students have had the experience of applying for direct-purchase
insurance pre-ACA. It also gives me a chance to explicitly link our bullseye to
the original social-ecological model, by way of contrasting it with the
outmoded behavioral model on which the vast majority of wellness programs
are based. I dislike the extent to which the Furrow book implies that wellness
programs are representative of public health intervention. They are not.
With Medicare, I introduce the distinction between coverage (what a health
plan covers) and eligibility (who a health plan covers), which everyone needs
to grasp quickly before we dive into the weeds with Medicaid. Along with our
discussion of the ACA’s tax penalties and subsidies, these topics allow us to
explore the role of government in making decisions about coverage and
eligibility. We also cover Medicare payment reforms in some detail, both so
that students are well prepared to take a follow-up course on Fraud and Abuse,
and because value- and quality-based payment models are giving providers a
greater financial stake in patient outcomes and thus a growing interest in the
social determinants of health operating upstream in their patient catchment
areas. In the course of these discussions, we touch on how each of these
programs bears evidence of policymakers’ reluctance to make decisions about
health care coverage and payment in a transparent, accountable fashion that
encourages public engagement and deliberation.
VI. PUSHING BEYOND HEALTH CARE
Ultimately, I only devote one class session to public health law—and not
only because if I spend more time on it, evaluations will be full of admonitions
that I focus too much on pet topics. I start with an overarching discussion of
social disparities in health. We begin with a few cases on overt discrimination
by health care providers. Students quickly see how inadequate current law is
for the task of tackling implicit bias, which is far more widespread than overt
discrimination. And then I really blow their minds by talking about how small
a role health care plays in determining health outcomes compared to behaviors
and environmental exposures and the social and economic conditions that
influence them. This tees up our discussion of public health law, which might
focus on drug-resistant tuberculosis, racial disparities in cervical cancer, or
noncommunicable diseases related to poor nutrition and physical inactivity,
depending on what I’m interested in at the time.
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CONCLUDING THOUGHTS ON LAW AS A TOOL FOR PROMOTING POPULATION
HEALTH
I like to use this discussion of public health law to make a broader point
that is implicit in the entire class, but rarely at the forefront, and one that goes
hand in hand with the social-ecological model of health: that law can be used
instrumentally and in an evidenced-based fashion to achieve particular goals. If
the goal is to preserve the effectiveness of antibiotics or community immunity
as public goods, there are legal tools for that. If the goal is to avoid iatrogenic
injuries, then malpractice liability, market-based regulatory regimes, and
information-based reporting requirements are all potential tools, each with its
own advantages and limitations, for achieving that goal. If the goal is to ensure
equitable access to health care, then tax penalties, subsidies, spending
programs, and direct regulation of private insurers are tools for achieving that.
Law itself is a determinant of health. If our laws promote equitable access to
high-quality health care that respects human dignity, then population health
will benefit. If our laws promote out of control spending on unnecessary and
sometimes harmful medical interventions and indiscriminate use of
antimicrobials, they will be to the detriment of public health.
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